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Abstract
Since World War II barriers  to  international trade  in  industrial
commodities have been reduced while barriers  to  agricultural commodity
trade have become more severe.  During the  last several decades  the world
has experienced cycles of  "food pessimism" and  "food optimism."
Nevertheless,  as  a result of  technical change the  terms  at which the
world's consumers can expect  to have access  to  food appears  to be  more
favorable in the  future  than in the past.  If consumers  are  to have  access
to  the greater abundance that can be made available,  it will be necessary
for developed market economies  to  reduce the  distortions resulting from
agricultural commodity and trade policies.  It  is  in the  interest  of both
producers and consumers,  in developed and developing countries,  that the
world move  toward an international trading regime  in which agricultural
commodities move  across national borders at least as  freely as  financial
resources.
1TOWARD A GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM
Throughout history a common concern of mankind has been to  assure an
abundant supply of food.  Since the  early 1980s,  however, the world has
appeared to be  awash in excess supplies  of agricultural commodities.  In
the developed market economies farmers and their representatives have
turned their attention to  policies designed to  reduce  the flow of
agricultural  commodities  into national and world markets.  The  fear of
scarcity has been replaced by a fear of abundance.
In this  article we  argue that  it is  in the  interest of  the world's
agricultural producers and consumers  to  embrace rather  than react against
the opportunities  for abundance that are within our grasp.  We also discuss
the reforms  in the United States',  in the  European Community's  and in a
number of other countries' agricultural commodity policies that will be
necessary if the world community is  to have access to  the abundance that
advances  in agricultural technology can make available.
Disintegration in World Agriculture
In the international system that emerged toward the end of the
nineteenth century agricultural commodities and raw materials were
exported from the recently settled countries of the  temperate  region and
from the tropical-colonial areas  to  the developed countries.  Industrial
products were exported by the more developed countries  to  the  less
developed world.  It was believed to be  to  the  economic advantage  of both
2the developed  (DC) and less  developed countries  (LDC) for each nation to
pursue its comparative  "natural advantage."1
The  system gradually broke down after World War I.  The period between
the  two world wars was characterized by both great instability and slow
economic growth.  Protectionism contributed to  and was  reinforced by the
Great Depression of the  1930s.  Efforts to  preserve national markets  for
domestic producers during the  depression resulted in  further declines  in
agricultural trade.
In contrast, the period after World War II,  until the late 1970s,  was
characterized by unprecedented rates  of growth in production and trade.
In the  developed countries agriculture became more fully integrated into
the  rest of the economy.  Purchased inputs  accounted for  an increasing
share of the value of agricultural output.  The  share of the labor force
employed in agriculture declined sharply.  The volume of agricultural  trade
expanded.  Yet the policies pursued by both the  DC's and the LDC's have
frustrated attempts  to achieve  the more complete integration of
agricultural commodity markets. 2 Agricultural trade became even more
distorted.  The developed countries have adopted even more protectionist
policies.  They supported agricultural prices,  restricted agricultural
imports,  and dumped surpluses onto  the world market.  The less  developed
countries reacted to  loss of market opportunities  and domestic pressures
for cheap food by policies  that hold prices paid to  their farmers below
world market levels--in effect  forcing their agricultural sector  to bear
the costs of protecting domestic  industry.
3The Great Transformation
While the policy regimes being pursued by both the developed and
developing countries was widening the  distortions  in agricultural
commodity markets,  the basis for comparative advantage  in agricultural
production was undergoing a dramatic change.  Prior  to  the beginning of
this century almost all  increases  in food production were obtained by
bringing new land into  production.  By the first decade of the next century
almost  all increases in world agricultural production must come  from higher
yields--from increased output per hectare.  In the developed countries  the
transition was  well underway during  the first half of the century.  Human
capital  and technical  inputs became  the dominant sources  of growth in
agricultural production.  The basis  for comparative advantage  in
agricultural production shifted from natural resource endowments  to
scientific and technical knowledge and skills.  Agriculture in  the
developed countries was evolving from a resource-based to  a science-based
industry.
During the  1960s  and 1970s  a number of developing countries  also began
to make the  transition to higher levels  of agricultural productivity.  A
new international agricultural research system was put in place.  A number
of national  agricultural research systems--in countries such  as  India,
Brazil, Thailand and Kenya--began to  achieve substantial capacity to
provide  their farmers with the new knowledge  and technology needed to
sustain agricultural production.
Many developing countries, however, are only now beginning to  put into
place the agricultural research and extension capacity needed to begin the
transition from a resource-based to  a science-based agriculture.
4Agricultural technology, particularly biological technology,  is highly
location specific.  In those countries and regions which do not make  the
research investments necessary to  gain access  to  the global advances  in
scientific  and technical knowledge, farmers will be unable to provide the
agricultural commodities necessary to make effective use of  their
particular resource endowments  or to meet the  elementary subsistence needs
of  their consumers.
Technology Pessimism and Food Pessimism
The 1960s  and the  1970s were characterized by a profound skepticism
regarding the benefits of advances in science and technology.  A view
emerged that the potential power created by advances  in science and
technology--reflected in the cataclysm of war, the degradation of the
environment, and the psychological costs of social change--were obviously
dangerous  to  the modern world and to  the future of the human species.  The
result was  to  question seriously the  significance  for human welfare of
scientific progress, technical change, and economic  growth.4
The ethical and  social criticisms of scientific and technical  change
seemed confirmed by a pessimism stemming from a new perception of the
limits  to  growth imposed by resource scarcity.  There was a pervasive
pessimism regarding the adequacy of natural resource  endowments and the
supply of resource commodities and  services.  Until well  into  the 1980s
there were  intense arguments  about whether energy and other commodity
prices would continue  to  rise until well into  the early years of the next
century or  if  they would stabilize near the high prices that prevailed at
5that time.  Almost no consideration was  given to  the possibility that
agricultural  commodity prices would actually decline.
This technology and resource pessimism was  readily translated into
pessimism about world food supply capacity.  Rising levels of food imports
by developing countries were  projected toward the end of the  century  and
beyond.  But  the historical record has not been consistent with  the
expectations.  Experience has  again seemed to  confirm the  optimistic
hypothesis that a stretch of high prices has not yet  failed to  result in
the  location of new resources,  improvements  in the  exploitation of  old
resources and  the development of technology to  facilitate  the  substitution
of more abundant for  less abundant  resources.5
By the mid-1980s  the  fear  of scarcity had largely dissipated.  The  new
technology and the new productive  capacity that had been generated by more
than a decade of rising commodity prices  began to disgorge  their products
into an economic environment that was experiencing a global  recession.  We
were confronted by what seemed to  be excess  capacity at a global level--in
energy,  in automobiles,  in steel,  and in agricultural commodities.  The
fear of scarcity was  replaced by a fear of abundance.  Slow growth of
effective  demand has  obscured the  fact  that  the  rate  of growth of basic
food staple production declined in  the developing countries  from the  1960s
to  the  1970s  and again in  the  1980s.
There was  one  clear lesson from those  resource and technology
assessment studies of the  1970s.  The analysts who constructed and
interpreted the futures models had  great difficulty  in insulating
themselves  from the  short run trends  and events  that dominated the
intellectual and policy environment at the  time  that  the assessments were
6made. 6 There are  large elements of  subjective judgement that enter into
estimation of  the  "trend"  and the  "analytical"  models and in the use of
the models to  simulate alternative futures.  The simulations for  the  1980s
and 1990s were strongly  influenced by the pervasive climate of  "food
pessimism" and, more broadly, of "technological pessimism"  that dominated
much of  the decade of the  1970s.  It seems  quite clear  that the model
builders and futures simulators  were influenced by an intellectual
environment that would  have regarded more optimistic projections as  "out
of  touch with reality."
Greater Abundance
Now that agricultural  commodity prices have begun to recover from  the
depressed levels  of the  1980s,  it does not take  too much prescience  to
again anticipate a new round of concern about long run food  futures.
Nevertheless,  the long term outlook is  for a continuing decline  in the real
prices of agricultural commodities.  Most of  the worlds consumers  can
expect to have access  to agricultural  commodities on increasingly favorable
terms.
This judgment is based on two fundamental assessments.  The  first is
that sometime  in the next century, world food demand, resulting from
population growth and income growth, can be expected, at  the global  level,
to  level off at somewhere  in the neighborhood of  20 percent of biological
food production potential.
7 The  second is  that,  as noted above, a large
number of countries have now established the  agricultural research capacity
and the capacity to  supply  the technical  inputs needed to  sustain
agricultural production.  At the very least the broader geographic bases  on
7which science-based agriculture now rests should imply both greater
stability and greater competition in meeting global food needs.
In the developed countries advances  in agricultural technology will be
driven primarily by advances in biological and information technology
rather than by advances in mechanical technology.  Advances  in animal
health and animal productivity will come first,  followed by advances  in
plant protection and only later by plant productivity.  But we see nothing
in the recent rash of  technology assessments  that leads us  to  anticipate,
over  the next several decades, the flood of excess production envisaged by
some of  the biotechnology enthusiasts.8 Productivity gains  in  the
developed countries--measured in terms of decline  in real costs of
production--are unlikely to  exceed the  rates achieved since  1940  (a) as  a
result of  the reduction in farm labor and work animal inputs associated
with advances  in mechanical technology and  (b) the advances  in crop yields
and animal feed efficiency resulting from advances  in plant and animal
breeding and in crop and animal nutrition.  The cost of saving an
additional man day by adding more horsepower per worker  is now playing
itself out  in countries  like  the United States, Canada and Australia.
In the developing countries the major gains  in crop and animal
productivity over  the next several decades will continue  to come  from
conventional sources.  In the  case of crops this means from conventional
crop breeding, from more effective management of water resources, and from
higher levels  of plant nutrients.  In animals  it means continued efforts
to enhance  feed efficiency through improved animal health,  improved feed
quality and improved management.  Those countries  that are not able  to
8establish viable public and private  sector agricultural research capacity
will not be able to  draw on even these  conventional sources  of  growth.  Nor
will they be able  to address the  serious environmental  consequences will
emerge either  from the  impact  of growth on demand, arising from population
and income growth, pressing against increasingly fragile environments or
from the impacts  of use of higher levels  of industrial  inputs  associated
with greater intensity of crop production.
Structural  Change
Beginning in  the  1960s  it became  clear that  the  economic environment
of agriculture had begun to  change significantly.  The international
financial markets became more  and more  integrated.  The collapse of the
Bretton Woods system resulted in increasingly volatile currency markets.
Agricultural commodity prices  and the  incomes  of farmers became
increasingly sensitive to  the economic environment outside  of agriculture--
to domestic fiscal and monetary policies and to  the  increasingly unstable
exchange rate regimes.9
With development agriculture  tends  to  lose  its  comparative advantage
relative  to  other sectors  of the  domestic economy.  In this  situation
policymakers  in newly industrializing countries  such  as Japan, Korea and
Taiwan, have tended to  follow the policies  of the older  industrial
countries by switching from taxing agriculture  to  subsidizing it. 10
However, attempts  to use agricultural producer price supports  to  resolve
the  intersector  income disparity problem have become both ineffective and
increasingly expensive.
9Changes  in technology and in the macro-economic environment are
forcing continued structural change within the agricultural sector.  Some
of these changes are so subtle  that they are  frequently overlooked by
casual observers.  In many cases  the  adjustment process  is  obvious.
Farming is discontinued altogether and new employment is  taken outside of
agriculture.  With growing integration of agriculture into the rest  of the
economy the structural adjustments may become more subtle.  Farmers  and
their families  in high  income countries find part-time employment outside
of agriculture.  Outmigration occurs  gradually over  several generations.
The growing share of  income of agricultural households from non-farm
employment reduces  the relative importance of agriculture as  primary source
of income.  In the  1940s  about 27 percent  of total income of US  farm
households came from nonagricultural employment.  In 1980  it was more than
60 percent11 l
The phenomenon of  the increasing integration of agriculture into  the
economy via non-agricultural  employment has  important implications  for
agricultural policy.  One is  that  as  the portion of the  income of farm
families accounted for by non-farm sources  rises,  agricultural policy can
do less and less  to  support the  income of  farm households via agricultural
price and/or income support.  A second is  that as  the share of  the  labor
force  in agriculture  declines, organized farmers make increasingly
attractive partners  in coalition politics.  They are thus  able  to maintain
political influence that substantially exceeds their relative  economic
significance.
The distribution of benefits  from agricultural programs that  subsidize
or protect farm prices are highly skewed.  Wealthy farmers are  the main
10beneficiaries.  Farmers at the  lower end of the  income range are,  all too
often, the ones  that deserve some income  support by any general standard of
social policy in developed countries.  But those  farmers do not benefit
much from subsidies.1 2 Finally, agricultural subsidies  tend to be
capitalized into land values.  Hence,  it  is  the landlords who benefit
rather than the  tillers.
Agriculture  is  subject  to considerable  risk and uncertainty due  to
natural sources--weather, and plant or animal disease.  Prices  tend to
fluctuate  sharply as  a consequence of only slight changes  in supply and/or
demand.  Over centuries farmers  in both less  developed and industrialized
countries of our  times have learned to  cope with these  instabilities.  The
pervasive nature of government market intervention together with the
growing integration of agriculture  into  the world economy has added a new
institutional source of  instability.  It  is  frequently argued that policy
related instabilities far exceed the  'natural' sources  of instability in
agriculture.  Of course, less  developed countries are much more susceptible
to  agricultural instabilities--both because a large share of their labor
force is  employed in agriculture  and because they are vulnerable  to  the
effects of policies adopted to protect farmers in the developed economies.
Many developing countries have, for example, experienced a sharp decline in
their sugar exports because the high sugar prices  in developed countries
have artificially stimulated the development of the corn sugar  (fructose)
industry.
11 Policy Distortions:  Agricultural Price Support  in the United States and
the European Community
Both the European Community and the United States  are major producers
and exporters  of important agricultural commodities.  Agricultural policies
in these  two political entities have a significant impact on world markets
of agricultural commodities and on international agricultural trade
patterns.  Both employ a large variety of agricultural policy instruments
that aim at supporting agricultural  incomes  such as  minimum prices,  import
tariffs,  export subsidies or supply controls.  The resulting international
effects  are that production and exports in both the United States  and the
European Community are higher and world market prices lower  than without
government intervention.  Central elements of agricultural policy in both
political entities are minimum prices  for domestic production.  While the
objective and the principles of government market intervention in the
United States and the European Community are  similar, namely to  provide
income  assistance through government market intervention, the specific
mechanisms employed are quite different.  Furthermore,  the  level of support
in the Community is  generally higher than in the United States.
In the European Community agricultural prices  are kept above
international levels predominantly by a system of variable  import levies,
export restitutions  (export subsidies) and minimum prices for domestic
production.  As  long as  the degree of self-sufficiency is below 100 percent
imports  are charged with a variable levy which is  the difference between
the so-called threshold price  (minimum import price) and whatever the world
price  is.  If domestic production exceeds consumption, the Community's
policy intervention is  symmetric.  In essence, it buys  the surplus
12production and pays producers at  fixed prices.  These are the so-called
intervention prices which have been set on most important agricultural
markets.  As  the intervention prices  are above world market  levels,  the
surplus production is  subsidized via export restitutions in order to  make
EC agricultural surpluses more competitive on the world markets.
Until a decade ago the European Community was a net importer of many
agricultural commodities.  Rapid productivity growth in EC agriculture
combined with CAP price supports  and export  subsidies have transformed the
Community into a major net exporter of agricultural commodities in an
increasing number of markets.  The widening gap between costs  of
production, which have been lowered by productivity growth, and the higher
prices recovered by farmers, resulting from CAP policies, have increased
the costs  of the program.  The export subsidies and other  CAP related
outlays have also resulted in rapidly growing budgetary expenditures which
have created financial  tensions and resulted in growing political disputes.
In spite of considerable political tension the financial resources
available  to  the Community have been increased.  In addition, domestic
production controls  of one form or another have been introduced to  limit
budget costs.  The Community is  also contemplating the  introduction of
additional  trade  distorting interventions such as  import restrictions on
protein meals  or a consumption tax on nondairy fats  and oils.
These additional trade distortions aimed at  increasing the  financial
resources of the Community would harm the United States and a number of
other developed and less developed commodity exporting countries.  The
United States,  in turn, has  threatened to  retaliate if  the Community were
to  introduce these additional trade  restrictions.  And other exporters,
13organized as  the  Cairns Group, are attempting to use  the forthcoming
"Uruguay Round" GATT negotiations  to bring pressure for more rational
agricultural commodity prices.
The participation in agricultural policy programs in the Community is
mandatory.  It  is,  for the most part, voluntary  in the United States.  The
major United States  agricultural commodity programs  can best be understood
as a system of renting sufficient land from farmers  in order to bring
production into  line with expected domestic utilization and exports at
acceptable price levels.  The two central mechanisms of US  agricultural
price  support programs  are the  loan rate and the  target price.  The  loan
rate represents  the price at which the  government provides  loans  to  farmers
to  enable  them to hold the crops  for later sale.  If the market price
exceeds the  loan rate,  farmers can sell their crops at  the market price and
repay the loan.  If the market price is below the  loan rate,  farmers  can
forfeit  the commodities placed under  loan to  the  government  instead of
repaying the  loan.  The  loan rate,  therefore, provides  a price  floor  for
domestic producers.
Deficiency payments, based on the difference between  the  target price
and the loan rate or the market price, are used as  a second inducement for
farmers to  participate in the program.  By setting  the loan rate at a
relatively low level  and the  target price at a high  level  the US  can
achieve market prices  that enable US  agricultural commodities  to move in
international markets without direct subsidies.
As  in the European Community price support and productivity growth
have led to burdensome budgetary expenditures which have led to various
additional measures  of domestic supply control, including deficiency
14payment limitations.  In recent years  the United States has also
introduced targeted export subsidies  in order to  penetrate overseas
markets.
Two major reforms are required in the EC,  the United States and other
developed countries.  One  is  the  delinking of income  support  for
disadvantaged farmers from commodity production.  The second is  the
integration of agricultural commodity markets among countries.  In  the next
section we consider some of the essential reforms necessary to  bring about
an integrated global agricultural  system.
Toward a Global Market
Doing away with policies  that distort agricultural production,
consumption and trade would have many benefits.  Consumers, producers,
taxpayers--the world economy as  a whole--would benefit greatly.
In LDCs,  abolishing the discrimination against agriculture would not only
lead to more efficient resource use but also  to  increased agricultural
production which  in turn would reduce balance of payment problems.
Many critiques  of agricultural policies,  especially of  those  in DCs,
have  frequently argued that the benefits of removing distortions in
agriculture are so  large  that  it would be beneficial for each individual
country to  reform agricultural policies  irrespective of what other
(developed) countries  do.  This  argument  is  certainly valid.  However,
agricultural policy makers  in the  DCs do not follow this advice.  This  is
because a significant part of  the benefits of policy reform in one  country,
where reform is not coordinated with other major trading countries, may be
eroded by the other country's policy adjustments.
15It has been shown that international interactions of national
agricultural policy decisions occur quasi-automatically.13 To  illustrate
this  consider a situation in which the United States would unilaterally do
away with all agricultural price support.  Since the United States  is  a
large country in terms  of agricultural production, the reduction in US
production resulting from declining producer prices would be followed by a
rise in world prices of agricultural commodities.  This would, in turn,
reduce the per unit export subsidies paid by the European Community and
thus  lower  EC  agricultural budget expenditures.  The Community tends  to
react to  budgetary relief with further upward adjustments  of its price
support.  The effect would be to  stimulate production in the  EC and reduce
world market prices.  This would,  in turn, drive up agricultural adjustment
costs  in the United States.  If the  European Community would unilaterally
reduce agricultural price  support, the reaction of US agricultural policy
would be  analogous.
An open international trading system that is  free of policy
distortions  is a public  good--it would be beneficial to  all parties.  But a
single country cannot supply  itself with this  international public good.
Reforms toward free trade  in agriculture will not come about in the
presence of incentives  to  free ride on other countries' agricultural trade
liberalization.  Thus an effective movement  toward freer trade will require
international policy coordination.14
Since  it  is  in most countries interest  (at least  in the long run),  to
establish and maintain a free and open international trading system, each
country also has  an incentive  to pursue  international agreements on
agricultural trade liberalization.  Perhaps the only way a more open
16international  trade regime for agricultural commodities can be produced is
through a system of reciprocal obligations  in which each country
contributes to  the public good--that is  each country agrees  to  remove or
reduce domestic policy distortions conditional upon other countries  doing
the  same.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT) has been rather
successful  in establishing a system of international trading rules that
have resulted in a reduction  in tariffs and freer  trade in industrial
products  since World War II.  The major exception, however,  is agriculture.
Agriculture has,  for  the most part, been exempt from GATT rules.  A major
objective  of the current Uruguay round of multinational trade negotiations
will be to  remove pervasive government intervention in agriculture with
all its  attendant negative economic and political consequences.  In an
increasingly international world only multilateral policy coordination has
a chance to bring about a freer and more open international agricultural
trading regime.
The proposed reforms will not be easy  to bring about.  They will be
opposed by agricultural  interest  in the  EC,  the US  and in Japan.  The main
proponents will be a group of smaller developed and less developed
countries  that depend heavily on agricultural commodity exports.  However,
the persistent  international disputes over agricultural trade restrictions
have  increasingly attracted the  attention of consumers and taxpayers  in the
EC,  the US and Japan.
We must also keep  in mind that at some time in the future  it may
become possible to  incorporate  the centrally planned economies  in  to  a more
fully integrated agricultural system.  The reforms  associated with the
17"household responsibility system"  in China have resulted in a decade of
exceptionally rapid growth in agricultural production.  If similar reforms
were  to occur in the USSR, it  is possible that Soviet agriculture could
again become a significant exporter or food grains.  One  step that might be
taken immediately  is  for  the centrally planned economies  to  engage in a
more active  scientific exchange with both the  developed market economies
and the  less  developed economies.  The other centrally planned economies
should also follow the  lead of Poland and begin to play a more active role
in the GATT.  If  this  should happen, it may, in the future, be  possible to
achieve a truly global agricultural system.
A Perspective
The abundance  that advances in agricultural science and technology can
make available has made  the protectionist agricultural policies pursued by
the developed market economies expensive  to both consumers  and producers.
The discriminatory policies  toward agriculture pursued by many developing
countries has deprived producers of the  incentives  that are necessary to
make the  potential abundance available  to  their poor consumers.  It  is  in
the interest of both producers  and consumers,  in developed and developing
countries, that the world move toward an  international trading regime  in
which agricultural commodities move across national borders at  least as
freely as  financial resources.  The  objective of the current round of GATT
negotiations should be to  reform world commodity policies  and markets
against that objective.
18Table  1.  Comparison  of the  nominal  rates of  acricultural  protection between
East Asian  countries  and  twelve other developed  countries, 1955 to
1980.
1955  1960  *  1963  1970  1975  1980  1984  (l9S6S
East  Asia:
Japan  18  41  .69-  74  76  85  102  (210) Korea  -46  -15  -4  29  30  117  137  (117) Taiwan  -17  -3  -1  2  20  52  43  (na)
European Cormnunity:
Denmark  5  3  5  17  19  25  12  (46) France  33  26  30  . 47  29  30  25  (75) Germany,  FR  35  48  . 55  50  39  44  49  (86) Italy  *  47  50  65.  69  33  57  20  (67 Netherlands  14  21  35  41  32.  27  15  (58) United Kingdom  40  37  20  27  6  35  15  (54)
AverageC  35  37  45  52  29  38  22  (63)
Non-allianced Europe:
Sweden  34  44  50  65  43  59  36  (63) Switzerland  60  64  73  96  96  126  153  (260)
Food Exporters:
Australia  5  7'  5  7  .5  -2  na  (na) Canada  0  4  2  5  7  -3  -3  -9) New Zealand  na  2  0  -5  -4  .2  (a) United States  2  1  9  11  4  0  6  6) 6  (6)
a  Defined  as  the percentage  by  which  thie  producer  price exceeds  the  border
price.  The estimates  shown are  the  weighted averages  for  12  conmodities,
using production  valued  at  border prices  as  weights.  The  12  cornrodities
include rice,  wheat,  barley, corn,  oats,  rye,  beef,  pork,  chicken, eggs,
milk and  suaar.
b.  Calculated by  applying the exchange rates  of September  1986  to the  1984  prices. c.  Weighted average for  all  six  countries shown  after 1970,  but  excluding  Denmark and  the  United  Kingdom  for  earlier  years.
Source: Kym Anderson  and  Yujiro Hayami, The Political Economy  of Agricultural  Protection:  East Asia in  International  Perspective.
(Sydney  London  and  Boston:  Allen  and  Unwin,  1986), p.26;  Masayoshi  Honma,
"Kokusaiteki  Kanten  Karamita  Nihon  Nogyo  no  Hogosuijun"  (Agricultural
Protection  Level  of  Japan  in  an  International  Perspective),  Paper presented
at  the  Modern  Economics  Mini-Conference,  held  at  the  Hitotsubashi  University
Institute  for  Economic  Research,  31. January  1987.
19Table 2 :  Per  capita income shares of  the agriculture  population in  the  United
States  from farm and non-farm sources,  1935-39  to  1975-80
Period  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80
-39  -44  -49  -54  -59  -64  -69  -74  -79
percent
farm income  66.7  71.4  73.5  69.1  63.4  58.4  51.9  52.4  47.8  37.4
percent
non-farm
income  33.3  28.6  26.5  30.9  36.6  41.6  48.1  47.6  52.2  62.6
Source:  G. Schmitt,  "Die  andere Dimension der  fortschreitenden Integration
der Landwirtschaft in eine wachsende Volkswirtschaft:  Das  Beispiel  der
Vereinigten Staaten."  Berichte  ueber Landwirtschaft  62  (1984):  13-39.
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AGRICULTURL OUTPUT P·ERAL-  WORKER
Source:  Yujiro  Hayami  and  Vernon  . Ruttan,  Agricultural
Development:  An  International  Perspective,  (Balit'ore:
The  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1985),  p.  124.





AGRICUkTURqAl  OUTPUT PER  MALi WORKeR
Source:  Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W.  Ruttan, Agricultural
Development:  An  International  Perspective,  (Balitmore:
The Johns  Hopkins University  Press,  1985),  p.  124.
21FIGLRE  2.  Real  prices of wheat and corn.  1866-1951.
6
a  *'  A'  '  '  Raa  wheat price
:
3 
§_  . wheReal  ca  t  price
1C.66  i80o  1900  1920  19';0  1960  1980
Sourve:  Michael  V.  Martin  and  Ray  F.  Brolkkn.  "Th.  Ss.-rin  Syndnrme:  Commenr."
American Journal  of Agriculural  Economics 65 (Febna.-  1933i: 159.
22Figure 3.  Models of  international adjustments associated with
unilateral and coordinated discontinuation of
price supports.
Unilateral  (uncoordinated) discontinuation of U.S.  price support
U.S. Producer Price  I  -- U.S.  production  J  --  world price t
- -CAP expenditures 1--  EC producer pricet
-*EC production f-eworld price 
Coordinated discontinuation of  price support  in developed countries
DC producer price J---DC production  -eWorld  price tt
---DC's budgetary expenditures for agricultural  price  support 
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